Classical and Quantum Contents of Solvable Game Theory on Hilbert Space by Cheon, Taksu & Tsutsui, Izumi
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
05
03
23
3v
2 
 2
8 
A
pr
 2
00
5
Classical and Quantum Contents of Solvable Game Theory on Hilbert Space
Taksu Cheon1 and Izumi Tsutsui2
1 Laboratory of Physics, Kochi University of Technology, Tosa Yamada, Kochi 782-8502, Japan
2 Institute of Particle and Nuclear Studies, KEK, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-0801, Japan
(Dated: April 28, 2005)
A simple and general formulation of the quantum game theory is presented, accommodating
all possible strategies in the Hilbert space for the first time. The theory is solvable for the two
strategy quantum game, which is shown to be equivalent to a family of classical games supplemented
by quantum interference. Our formulation gives a clear perspective to understand why and how
quantum strategies outmaneuver classical strategies. It also reveals novel aspects of quantum games
such as the stone-scissor-paper phase sub-game and the fluctuation-induced moderation.
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Attempts to extend game-theoretical strategies to the
quantum domain [1, 2, 3] have attracted journalistic at-
tention in the academic community and beyond, with an
intriguing solution to the classical problem of the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma [4]. The substance of the emerging quan-
tum game theory, however, is still shrouded in mystery,
and in spite of the rapid accumulation of literature [5],
we still find ad hoc assumptions and arbitrary procedures
scattered in the field. Quite naturally, there have been
persistent doubts as to their generality and finality [6, 7].
For the quantum treatment of game strategies to become
truly a theory, a workable framework to accommodate all
possible quantum states available in the system, prefer-
ably with analytic solutions illuminating its structure, is
highly desired. In particular, it needs to clarify the reason
behind the puzzling effectiveness of quantum strategies
in situations where their classical counterparts fail to give
satisfactory results.
In this article, we attempt to answer this call with a
full Hilbert space formulation of the game theory. It is
shown that assigning vectors in a Hilbert space to game
strategies entails the introduction of an element that pro-
vides correlation for the strategies of the individual play-
ers. For two strategy games, the correlation is generated
by operators that implement swapping and simultaneous
renaming of the player’s strategies. The quantum game
is then split into two parts, one consisting of a family of
classical games and the other representing the genuine
quantum ingredient of the game. The game, as a whole,
is solvable. We illustrate our formalism with numerical
examples on Prisoner’s Dilemma and discuss the classical
and quantum contents appearing in the Nash equilibria.
We also point out the existence of such curious phenom-
ena as the stone-scissor-paper game found for phase vari-
ables of the strategy, and the quantum moderation which
occurs for fluctuating correlations.
To present our scheme of quantum game, we first con-
sider Hilbert spaces HA and HB in which the strate-
gies of the two players A and B are represented by vec-
tors |α〉A ∈ HA and |β〉B ∈ HB. The entire space of
strategy of the game is then given by the direct product
H = HA×HB . A vector in H represents a joint strategy
of the two players and can be written as
|α, β; γ〉 = J(γ) |α〉A |β〉B , (1)
where the unitary operator J(γ) provides quantum cor-
relation (e.g., entanglement) for the separable states
|α〉A |β〉B. Note that J(γ) is independent of the play-
ers’ choice and is determined by a third party, which is
hereafter referred to as the coordinator.
Once the joint strategy is specified with J(γ), the play-
ers are to receive the payoffs, which are furnished by the
expectation values of self-adjoint operators A and B:
ΠA(α, β; γ) = 〈α, β; γ|A|α, β; γ〉 , (2)
ΠB(α, β; γ) = 〈α, β; γ|B|α, β; γ〉 .
Each of the players then tries to optimize their strategy
to gain the maximal payoff, and our question is to find,
if any, a stable strategy vector which corresponds to the
quantum version of the Nash equilibrium. Namely, we
seek a point (α, β) = (α⋆, β⋆) in the strategy space at
which the payoffs separately attain the maxima as
δαΠA(α, β
⋆; γ)|α⋆ = 0, δβΠB(α⋆, β; γ)|β⋆ = 0, (3)
under arbitrary variations in α and β.
A symmetric quantum game is defined by requiring
that the strategy spaces of the two players are the same
in dimensionality, dimHA = dimHB = n, and that the
payoffs are symmetric for two players. The latter condi-
tion is expressed as
ΠA(α, β; γ) = ΠB(β, α; γ) (4)
in terms of identically labeled strategies for both players
|α〉A =
∑
i
αi |i〉A , |β〉B =
∑
i
βi |i〉B , (5)
with complex numbers αi, βi normalized as
∑
i |αi|2 =∑
i |βi|2 = 1. Here we have used a common orthonormal
basis for both of the players, namely, a set of strategies of
the two players which are in one-to-one correspondence
2|i〉A ↔ |i〉B for i = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1. Introducing the swap
operator S by
S |i, j〉 = |j, i〉 (6)
for the states |i, j〉 = |i〉A |j〉B , we have S |α, β〉 = |β, α〉
for general separable states |α, β〉 = |α〉A |β〉B. For our
convenience, we introduce two more operators C and T
defined by
C |i, j〉 = |¯i, j¯〉 , T |i, j〉 = |j¯, i¯〉 , (7)
where the bar represents the complimentary choice; i¯
= (n−1)− i. The operator C is the simultaneous renam-
ing (conversion) of strategy for two players, and T is the
combination T = CS. These operators {S,C, T } com-
mute among themselves and satisfy S2 = C2 = T 2 = I,
T = SC, S = CT and C = TS. With the identity I,
they form the dihedral group D2.
In terms of the correlated payoff operators,
A(γ) = J†(γ)AJ(γ), B(γ) = J†(γ)BJ(γ), (8)
we have ΠA(α, β; γ) = 〈α, β| A(γ) |α, β〉. It is convenient
to choose the unitary operator J(γ) such that A(0) is
diagonal in the product basis |i, j〉. The game is then
symmetric if B(0) = SA(0)S, in which case B(0) is diag-
onalized simultaneously with the eigenvalues swapped,
〈i′, j′| A(0) |i, j〉=Aijδi′iδj′j , (9)
〈i′, j′| B(0) |i, j〉=Ajiδi′iδj′j .
Observe that ΠA(α, β; 0) = ΠB(β, α; 0) =
∑
i,j xiAijyj
with xi = |αi|2, yj = |βj |2 being the probability of choos-
ing the strategies |i〉A, |j〉B. This means that, at γ = 0,
our quantum game reduces to the classical game with the
payoff matrix Aij under mixed strategies.
Now we restrict ourselves to two strategy games n = 2.
The entire Hilbert space is spanned by |α, β; γ〉 with the
unitary operator J(γ) in the form
J(γ) = J(0) eiγ1S/2eiγ2T/2, (10)
where γ = (γ1, γ2) are real parameters. Note that, on
account of the relation S+T−C = I valid for n = 2, only
two operators are independent in the set {S,C, T }. For
simplicity, we assume that A is diagonalized under the
basis |i, j〉, which implies J(0) = I and A(0) = A. The
correlated payoff operator A(γ) is split into two terms
A(γ) = Apc(γ) +Ain(γ) (11)
where Apc is the “pseudo classical” term and Ain is the
“interference” term given, respectively, by
Apc(γ)=cos2γ1
2
A+(cos2
γ2
2
−cos2γ1
2
)SAS+sin2
γ2
2
CAC,
Ain(γ)= i
2
sin γ1(AS−SA) + i
2
sin γ2(AT−TA). (12)
Correspondingly, the full payoff is also split into two con-
tributions from Apc and Ain as ΠA = ΠpcA + ΠinA . To
TABLE I: The quantum Nash equilibria with edge strategies.
The conditions for their appearance and their maximal payoffs
under variations of γ are shown.
|α⋆, β⋆〉 |0, 0〉 |1, 1〉 |0, 1〉 |1, 0〉
Condition H+ > 0 H− > 0 H+ < 0 H+ < 0
H− < 0 H− < 0
Max(Π⋆A) A00 A00 A11 A01+A10−A11
Max(Π⋆B) A00 A00 A01+A10−A11 A11
evaluate the payoff, we may choose both α0 and β0 to
be real without loss of generality, and adopt the notaions
(α0, α1) = (a0, a1e
iξ) and (β0, β1) = (b0, b1e
iχ). The out-
come is
ΠpcA (α, β; γ) =
∑
i,j
a2i b
2
jApcij (γ), (13)
ΠinA (α, β; γ)
= −a0a1b0b1[G+(γ) sin(ξ + χ) +G−(γ) sin(ξ − χ)],
with Apcij (γ) = 〈i, j| Apc(γ) |i, j〉 and
G+(γ)=(A00 −A11) sin γ2, (14)
G−(γ)=(A01 −A10) sin γ1.
The split of the payoff shows that the quantum game
consists of two ingredients. The first is the pseudo clas-
sical ingredient associated with ΠpcA in (13), whose form
indicates that we are, in effect, simultaneously playing
three different classical games, i.e., the original classical
game A, the altruistic game SAS [8] and the converted-
value game CAC with the mixture specified by given γ1
and γ2. Regarding γ as tunable parameters, we see that
the quantum game contains a family of classical games
that includes the original game. The second ingredient of
the quantum game is the purely quantum component ΠinA ,
which occurs only when both of the two players adopt
quantum strategies with a0a1b0b1 6= 0 and non-vanishing
phases ξ and χ. The structure of ΠinA suggests that this
interference term cannot be simulated by a classical game
and hence represents the bona fide quantum aspect.
We can find the quantum Nash equilibrium strategy
explicitly by considering the condition (3) for the payoff
obtained above. It can be readily confirmed that, modulo
arbitrary phases, the “edge” strategies |α⋆, β⋆〉 given by
|α⋆, β⋆〉 = |0, 0〉 , |1, 1〉 , |0, 1〉 , |1, 0〉 (15)
can furnish Nash equilibria, depending on the signs of
the functions
H±(γ) = τ(A) ±
[
G′+(γ) +G
′
−(γ)
]
, (16)
where we define τ(A) = A00−A01−A10+A11 and also
G′+(γ) = (A00−A11) cos γ2, G′−(γ) = (A01−A10) cos γ1.
The precise conditions for the appearance of the equi-
libria, together with their maximal payoffs Π⋆A(γ) =
ΠA(α
⋆(γ), β⋆(γ); γ) obtained under variations of γ, are
summarized in TABLE I.
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FIG. 1: The quantum Nash equilibrium payoff Π⋆A(γ) = ΠA(α
⋆, β⋆; γ) (or ΠA(P
∗
A, P
∗
B ; γ) for mixed quantum strategies)
as a function of γ. Only the region γ1, γ2 ∈ [0, pi] is shown since Π
⋆
A(γ) has the reflection invariance Π
⋆
A(2pi − γ1, γ2) =
Π⋆A(γ1, 2pi − γ2)= Π
⋆
A(γ1, γ2). The extra invariance Π
⋆
A(pi − γ1, pi − γ2) = Π
⋆
A(γ1, γ2) is also visible. (a) Edge state Nash
equilibria for A00=3, A01=0, A10=5 and A11=1. The value (γ1, γ2)=(0.9272, 0) gives the maximum payoff Π
⋆
A = 4 for one of
the players. (b) Symmetric mixed quantum Nash equilibrium with the same parameters as (a). The maximum payoff Π⋆A = 3
is obtained at γ⋆2 = 0 and 1.3694 ≤ γ
⋆
1 < pi. (c) Mixed Nash equilibrium for A00=3, A01=0, A10=5 and A11=0.2. The two
bumps near the left and right ends are due the pure symmetric Nash equilibria (20).
For illustration, let us consider the case where the
classical game γ = 0 exhibits the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
A01 <A11 <A00 <A10. Adopting the numerical values
used in [2], we observe from FIG. 1(a) that two asym-
metric Nash equilibria coexist in the middle strip that
separates the two domains where the symmetric Nash
equilibria arise. The maximal payoff for player A is
achieved by the equilibrium strategy |1, 0〉 at the optimal
choice (γ⋆1 , γ
⋆
2)= (2 arcsin
√
λ, 0), and also by its symmet-
ric partner |0, 1〉 at (pi − 2 arcsin
√
λ, pi) where we use
λ = (A11 −A01)/(A10 − A01). (17)
Interestingly, the maximal payoff is better than that ob-
tained when the players decide to “deny” |1, 1〉 or “con-
fess” |0, 0〉. Note that the joint strategies (1) of the play-
ers realized at these Nash equilibria are actually entan-
gled due to the correlation factor J(γ). Indeed, the en-
tropy of entanglement S(ρred) evaluated for the reduced
density operator ρred [9] of the optimal state reads
S(ρred) = −λ logλ− (1 − λ) log(1 − λ), (18)
which is nonvanishing since 0 < λ < 1 for the Prisoner’s
Dilemma. The optimal equilibrium, however, does not
provide a desired resolution for the dilemma, because it
is achieved at the expense of player B receiving a lower
payoff. In fact, in the middle strip, the original Prisoner’s
Dilemma turns into the Game of Chicken which has its
own dilemma of a different kind.
Leaving the numerical example aside for now, we re-
turn to the general case, and examine the possibility of
a pure Nash equilibrium which is not one of the edge
states. The interference term ΠinA now comes into play,
and applying the condition for phases, δξΠA|ξ=χ=ξ⋆ , we
obtain
cos 2ξ⋆ = −G−(γ)/G+(γ). (19)
When |G−| ≤ |G+|, there is an equilibrium solution
ξ = χ = ξ⋆ with the payoff ΠinA = a0a1b1b1∆(γ), where
∆(γ) =
√
G2+ −G2−. The condition for the amplitudes
δa0ΠA = 0 and δb0ΠB = 0 then provides, along with the
edge state solutions (15), the symmetric solution,
a⋆0 = b
⋆
0 =
(
H−(γ)−∆(γ)
H+(γ) +H−(γ)− 2∆(γ)
)1/2
, (20)
which is valid (0 ≤ a⋆0 ≤ 1) if (H+ −∆)(H− − ∆) ≥ 0.
There is no asymmetric pure Nash equilibria apart from
the two edge solutions.
When |G−| > |G+|, there is no dominant strategy for
the phases: the player A tries to top playerB by choosing
a phase which is off by pi/2 to maximize ΠinA . The player
B does the same, and if the game is played repeatedly,
the result is a uniform random distribution for both ξ
and χ. This is a continuous version of the paper-scissor-
stone game for phases, and results in the zero average
for the interference term, ΠinA = 0. Thus, we reach for-
mally the same symmetric solution (20) with ∆(γ) = 0.
The existence requirement of the solution simplifies to
H+H− ≥ 0 for this case, and we find, from TABLE I,
that the equilibrium appears precisely in the region of
the asymmetric pure Nash equilibria.
The foregoing argument is made formal by considering
themixed quantum strategies specified by probability dis-
tributions PA(α), PB(β) over the players’ actions normal-
ized under suitable measures dα, dβ. The distribution-
averaged payoff can be defined as ΠX(PA, PB ; γ) =∫
dαdβPA(α)ΠX(α, β; γ)PB(β) for X = A,B. The play-
ers seek a distribution PA = PB = P
⋆ which simultane-
ously maximize ΠA(PA, PB; γ) and ΠB(PA, PB; γ). Such
a distribution furnishes a mixed quantum Nash equilib-
rium, extending the concept of the pure quantum Nash
equilibrium specified by single values of α and β. Note,
however, that the latter is already probabilistic in terms
of classical strategies, possessing a classical mixed strat-
egy game as a subset. The former, on the other hand,
is probabilistic in terms of quantum strategies, and is
realized by an ensemble of quantum systems.
4In FIG. 1(b), the mixed quantum Nash equilibrium
payoff for the Prisoner’s Dilemma of FIG. 1(a) is shown
as a function of γ. In the middle strip, asymmetric equi-
libria, which are known to be dynamically unstable [10],
are now replaced by the mixed Nash equilibrium given
by (20) with ∆(γ) = 0. The global maximum of the
payoff Π⋆A(γ
⋆) = A00 is attained along the line γ
⋆
2 = 0,
2 arcsin
√
η ≤ γ⋆1 ≤ pi with η = (A10−A00)/(A10−A01).
We mention that the quantum Nash equilibrium found
in [2] corresponds to (γ1, γ2) = (pi/2, 0) in our scheme.
Unlike the optimal point |1, 0〉, the joint strategy state
of this equilibrium remains to be |0, 0〉 and hence is not
entangled. In fact, the entanglement of the Nash equilib-
rium is inessential in this example, since the interference
term vanishes for all parameter values, leaving only clas-
sically interpretable terms.
The truly quantum characteristics of the game mani-
fests itself when the non-edge solution (20) appears. We
show an example of such cases in FIG. 1(c) which is ob-
tained by modifying the payoff parameters slightly from
the previous ones. Here, the Nash equilibria (20) con-
tributes to the increase of the payoff as seen by the convex
structures at the two ends. Examination of the solution
to other types of quantum games [11, 12] would naturally
be the next task.
There are several different interpretations possible for
the role of the coordinator J(γ). The first is that it fur-
nishes the unitary family of payoff operators A(γ) from
a given classical payoff matrix Aij , and therefore acts in-
dependently from the two players. The second is that it
acts as a collaborator to the players and serves to max-
imize the payoff at the Nash equilibria by tuning γ as
δγΠA|γ⋆ = 0. In the above numerical examples, we have
started from the first interpretation and tacitly moved to
the second. Yet another interpretation of the coordinator
is that it generates quantum fluctuations for the payoffs
by randomizing the parameter γ. In this case, the game
is effectively given as an average over the fluctuations,
and may be studied by integrating out the parameters γ1
and γ2. At the level of the payoff operator, the outcome
is expressed as
∫
dγ1dγ2A(γ) = 1
2
A+
1
2
CAC, (21)
which implies that the quantum fluctuations yield quan-
tum moderation to the game by washing out the individ-
ual’s preference.
We conclude this article by examining the quantum
and classical aspects of strategies in our formulation. We
first stress that our treatment is based on the full set of
quantum strategies, and thus the quantum Nash equi-
libria obtained here are truly optimal within the entire
Hilbert space.
Among the quantum Nash equilibria, those obtained
within the classical family can always be simulated by
some classical means, even when their joint strategy
states are entangled in the Hilbert space. In a sense, these
classically realizable quantum strategies are the possible
link between the quantum game theory and the classical
games in macroscopic social and ecological settings. In
contrast, the quantum solutions that arise only with the
interference terms represent the first genuinely quantum
Nash equilibria, offering superior payoffs, that have no
counterparts in classical strategies,
For the comprehensive classification of the quantum
games in our scheme, the full analysis of the classical
family is indispensable. This should also pave the way to
the extension for games with more than two strategies
and two players.
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